

Senior Research Staff on International Communism

25 March 1960

VULNERABILITIES OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

- I What is the "Bloc"?
- A. USSR and China plus their satellites - 12 countries in all.  
Yugoslavia firmly dissociated itself in November 1957, but still regards itself as a "socialist" country.
- B. The term "Bloc" is rejected by the Communists as applied to their own organization. They apply it only to "military blocs, " the Western alliance system.
- C. Communists use three terms to describe their organization:
1. "World socialist system" contrasted with "capitalist" or "imperialist system" - description of an "objective" entity.
  2. "Socialist camp" - an expression of defensive-aggressive militant solidarity.
  3. "Commonwealth of socialist nations" - (Russian word "sodruzhestvo, " an association in friendship - "druzhiba").  
Term little noticed in West (cf. article by Dr. Kurt London in Orbis, Winter 1960). Idea of a loose association of

DOCUMENT NO. 2  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 13 MAY 82 REVIEWER: 103430

equal independent states, which may provide a clue to future organizational developments.

- D. For purposes of this discussion, the USSR will be the point of primary focus, but reference will be made to relations with China, the satellites, and the complex of Free World CP's which constitute the network of International Communism.
- E. This system is treated by the Communists as in polarized antagonism to the "world capitalist system," led by the United States, and consisting primarily of the industrialized countries of Western Europe and Japan. This is expressed in "Bloc" form by the network of Western Alliances, NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, which include stooge countries - Iran, Pakistan, Thailand - "running dogs of capitalism."
- F. A "new" feature of this world alignment, proclaimed at the XX CPSU Congress (February 1956) is the emergence of a Great Zone of Peace, consisting largely of countries on the periphery of the two systems. This vast area is a composite of
1. Countries still under the "colonialist and imperialist yoke";
  2. Semi-colonial countries;
  3. Countries which have achieved "national liberation."

It is largely, though not exactly, co-equal to the area of "under-development." Communist strategy toward this area is based on

1. Aid to the "national liberation movement."
2. Channeling of the forces of explosive nationalism in the direction of "socialism" with a view to eventual Communist takeover.
3. Development aid programs, competitive with those of the United States and other Free World countries.

G. It would appear that the Communist leaders - at least in the USSR, the position of China being equivocal - visualize the "Commonwealth" formula, as a device to further the above strategy.

H. For this reason, there is some current emphasis on a doctrine enunciated by Khrushchev at the XXI CPSU Congress (January 1959) that all Communist Parties are equal; the CPSU, though enjoying a certain moral and ideological leadership in virtue of its history, its prestige and its achievements, does not exercise hegemony over the movement. This emphasis on equality is largely spurious, but in the light of China's approach to co-equality, it is tactically necessary.

- I. This has been countered by Secretary Herter's statement that the USSR bears basic responsibility for the actions of its satellites, and of the Communist Parties in all countries. Actually, it would seem that both Khrushchev and Herter have shied away from insistence on their respective "doctrines."
- II. Attitude of the Bloc toward its own power.
  - A. Communist propaganda everywhere stresses this theme: a decisive shift has taken place in the balance of power between the two world systems; the "socialist system" now is firmly established over one-third of the earth's area and population. The balance is further shifting to its advantage, both because it is growing in internal strength creating the "material base of socialism" and because the uncommitted areas are gravitating in its direction.
  - B. This shift is inexorable, and will be accelerated as the "capitalist system" moves towards its inevitable decline, as the result of the iron laws of historical process.
  - C. The Communist leaders - especially Khrushchev - proclaim that their system is essentially invulnerable and that this is so ordained by historical dictation. At times, this confidence seems to border on hubris.

D. There is, of course, a certain element of psychological warfare in this repetitive assertion of invincibility, sticking-pins-in-the-wax-image of capitalism to make it wither away. It may also conceal areas of gnawing doubt, and even fear, but we should be on guard against interpretations such as that of Crankshaw, which imply that anxiety - even desperation - is motive spring of Khrushchev's aggressiveness. This view, buttressed by dubious findings of speculative Kremlinology, can only foster a dangerous complacency.

III. What are vulnerabilities?

- A. Much used term, often reflects superficial analysis and wishful thinking.
- B. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in a society or system which
  - 1. Could lead to its dissolution, or degeneration to the point where it could be overthrown from within or without;
  - 2. Could evolve in direction which would convert system from a menace to an acceptable object of coexistence on this planet.

C. Vulnerabilities further break down into

1. Short range - e.g. a temporary shortage of housing or other consumer goods, immediate reactions to liberalizing movements, such as the exchange program or relaxation of police controls.
2. Long range - these are basic intra-system developments which can affect a whole generation, e.g. the impact 10 or 20 years hence of a continuing series of liberalizations, such as those mentioned above.

D. Vulnerabilities also are

1. Self-enhancing, or inherent in the dynamics of the system itself - this is the area of concern of the social scientist, and eventually, the historian.
2. Susceptible of intensification or exacerbation by outside action of a foreign power. This is the classic area of psychological and political warfare.

IV. What should be our analysis of Bloc vulnerabilities?

- A. First step is to rid ourselves of all wishfulness. The challenge is cold and objective - we cannot be ostriches.
- B. At least temporarily suspend purely Western or Free World concepts in analyzing them.

1. It is always a counsel of prudence - and a tonic experience - to try to view Communist developments through their own eyes.
2. Western shibboleths, themselves, are in need of perennial review (witness the President's Commission on National Goals).

C. Examples of clichés which may not apply:

1. A planned economy cannot compete with one based on free initiative (most serious people recognize that the planned Soviet economy has achieved a striking measure of success).
2. A regimented society cannot command the support of the people in competition with a free society. (This fails to take account of the fact that most of mankind, including the USSR, have historically lived under autocratic governments, and do not have the tradition of freedom which has been built up slowly in our society).

V. What should be our operational approach to vulnerabilities in the Communist system?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- A. Having conducted the analysis in the light of III and IV, and determined that a vulnerability exists in a specific area, we must then determine whether it is
  - 1. Self-energizing, i. e. best be left to develop on its own dynamics;
  - 2. Susceptible of intensification by means available to us.
- B. Under A. 1., we must bear in mind that
  - 1. Openly pointing out an adverse development may lead to strenuous efforts by the other side to correct it;
  - 2. We often mislead ourselves as to our motives when we openly harp on a vulnerability;
    - a. We may be trying to impress ourselves; a journalist may be trying to score a point (Alsop in Hong Kong interviewing refugees from the communes);
    - b. We may be impressing primarily our friends, or those who already agree with us.
- C. Under A. 2., we must make a double calculation:
  - 1. What will happen if we fail? Will we be discredited by having publicly taken a demonstrably false position? E. g., suppose we had spread the word that the Soviets had disastrously failed in their efforts to launch a manned satellite, and a week later they succeeded?



2. What will happen if we succeed? Suppose it were our objective to drive the USSR and China into open conflict and we were successful, what would be the results?

D. Summing up this preliminary analysis one would emphasize:

1. The relativity of the concept of vulnerability itself.
2. The need for well-organized studies in depth of the nature of vulnerabilities, short and long range.
3. The danger of self-delusion or miscalculation.
4. The need for rigid objectivity in approaching both the analysis and exploitation of vulnerabilities.
5. Recognition that the fundamentals of our present polarized conflict with Communism may change in unpredictable ways as other, non-polarized forces develop.
6. The basic principle that our source of comfort should not be the weaknesses of an adversary, but our own strengths which we must develop.

VI. The "transition to Communism."

- A. Most important theme of current Soviet propaganda and agitation.

1. Distinction between socialism "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" and Communism "to each according to his needs."  
(Note that Senator Humphrey appeared to be ignorant of theoretical handling of this distinction, when he expressed amazement at Khrushchev's remarks on subject).
2. Within USSR socialism has been fully achieved and the transition to Communism has begun.
3. Even in USSR, process will be gradual and presumably long - careful avoidance of specifying time-table (though period of 15 years is often mentioned as being an especially significant first phase).
4. Communism can only be fully realized when a number of conditions have been realized, particularly:
  - a. High material base of production.
  - b. Elimination of difference between town and country.
  - c. Elimination of difference between manual and intellectual labor.
  - d. Fully developed Communist "consciousness" among masses.

5. Neither China nor any of the satellites has completed building of socialism.
  - a. Claims of Chinese in connection with commune system opposed by Soviet spokesman as "utopian" and "impetuous" - note that Chinese leaders, themselves, in December 1958 acknowledged Soviet rebuke, using Stalinist phraseology "dizziness with success."
  - b. "Status seeking" game goes on among satellites, and one or more, e.g. Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria, may be accorded honor of having completed building of socialism in near future.
6. New doctrine developed by Khrushchev of "nearly simultaneous entry" into transition to Communism designed to eliminate vestiges of inequality in Bloc. Not clear how this is to work out, unless rate of growth of backward satellites increases much faster than that of advanced ones, of which no sign at present.

B. Essential elements of the "transition."

1. Ideological - program organic to Marxism-Leninism, which proclaims scientific knowledge of historical laws of dialectic which make ultimate goal of world Communism

2. The material base - expansion of economic production on basis of planned scientific technological progress.
3. The "new Communist man," who is to be created by a process of conditioning and indoctrination, developed through scientific study in the behavioral sciences and in pedagogy.
4. The withering of the state. This is a difficult area for Communist theorists who are aware that taken literally, this process cannot occur short of the millenium. Certain token steps can be made now, especially emphasis on "social organizations" for enforcement of law and order (so-called "comradely courts," "people's militia," etc. which are being pushed in USSR, though on limited scale). Meantime such essentials as powerful military organization and state planned and operated economy will continue in being, far into the "transition."
5. Continuing leading role of the Communist Party.  
While some lip-service must be granted to "withering of state," there can be no ambiguity about the proposition

that party will continue throughout the "transition."

Whether it also would wither away when the full state of Communism is reached is a subject of some equivocation.

VII. The doctrine of "contradictions" as key to the analysis of Communist vulnerabilities.

A. Suggested above that study of Communist vulnerabilities avoid use of Western terminology.

1. Western terminology includes: "stresses and strains," "hauling and pulling," "tensions." All these imply differences involving straight destructive conflict.
2. Use of these terms leads to conclusion that there is a "rift," a hostile divergence externally between China and the USSR, or internally between the regime and the people.
3. This readily runs into assumption that the "rift" will grow, and that ultimately it will prove fatal. This last assumption is often purely wishful.

B. Use of Communist terminology - the theory of "contradictions."

1. "Contradictions" are opposites, which interact, unite and engender new opposites, ad infinitum; famous

thesis-antithesis-synthesis

2. They exist in literally every aspect of nature and human life: positive and negative electricity, growth and decay of organisms, dying social forms which are challenged and overcome by new living forms.
  3. This is a universal law, and acceptance of it, in Communist eyes, is the secret of Marxist-Leninist dynamics.
- C. Communists distinguish "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic" contradictions. (Mao the leading theorist on this theme - Khrushchev has shied away from it, though Soviet ideologists acknowledge validity).
1. Former, as in class conflict, can only be resolved by violent overthrow, by revolution.
  2. Latter are internal to a classless society, and can be resolved constructively and peacefully by evolution, through persuasion, education, criticism and self-criticism.
- D. Importance of this point is that if we analyze vulnerabilities in Western terminology they may appear more capable of exploitation than if we analyze them in terms of "contradictions." We must remember that the Communists not only

acknowledge "contradictions," but in a sense they glory in them. They are dynamic and are therefore a source of strength rather than weakness. Perhaps we do not have to accept this view fully, but it is most important that we consider it before predicating our policy on the Western assumption.

VIII. Military Vulnerabilities.

- A. Before approaching specific themes of the "transition" as vulnerabilities the military field must be considered first, primarily in order to dismiss it as a major factor of calculation. Each side of East-West bloc polarization possesses, or must be assumed to possess, capability for extinguishing the other. Thus mutual deterrence appears to be a fact, and as long as both sides continue their efforts to develop defense and offense in parallel, presumably it will continue indefinitely. In this respect we must assume, both in long and short range, and in external and internal categories, the Soviet Union will not become vulnerable.
- B. New factors may modify this, but at present they are unpredictable.

1. Disarmament - Khrushchev has set maximum goal or bargaining position - total disarmament. Professes to believe this would benefit all nations, even including capitalist (significant departure from classic Marxist view that capitalist monopolies and imperialists need ever-expanding armament production for profits, and even survival of their system).
  2. Scientific or technological break-throughs - doubtful that any could be achieved which would hold out possibility of devastating attack with impunity.
  3. The n'th nuclear power problem - long range nightmare (H-bombs in hands of Trujillo!) is less important than specific prospect of China getting nuclear capability. Apparently Khrushchev as anxious to see this not happen as we. Doubtful, however, that this is a vulnerability of Bloc solidarity.
- C. Attitude of Soviet military - undoubtedly major disarmament and reduction of armed forces would create some distress among Soviet military.
1. Current reduction of 1,200,000 clearly a sensitive point, but being handled very carefully by regime, unlikely to lead to major difficulties.



2. No evidence that military budget has been or will be skimmed, so long as armament race continues. Especially in advanced weapons fields, arms production has top claim on resources (interesting that this is only major field in which dollar-ruble ratio of production costs is below the official 4-1 rate, i.e. military allocation, ruble for ruble, goes farther than that of any other category of state-planned expenditure).
3. Military in general will remain loyal to regime and accept CPSU guidance. Zhukov lesson that Army is fully subordinate to Party. As World War II heroes "fade away," danger of "man on white charger" ever more remote.

IX. The ideological vulnerability.

- A. Basic argument among social scientists as to relative role of ideological vs. power considerations in actions of communist leaders largely inconclusive. Best to regard this also as a "contradiction" which resolved dialectically, with varying degrees of success.

- B. Marxist-Leninist ideology provides matrix of action to Communists, as to large degree Hellenic-Judaeo-Christian tradition does to our own leaders. Difference lies in dynamics of organizational system, and of men who make it up. Communism is a "secular religion," a "20th century Islam" still in its expanding, world-conquering phase.
- C. Problem for vulnerability analysis: has this "revolutionary fervor" begun to "erode"?
  - 1. Difference of generations: Old Bolsheviks largely gone, second generation (Khrushchev and present leaders) still resolutely carry the flame directly handed to them, but what of third, upcoming generation?
  - 2. Considerable evidence of changing attitudes toward ideology and indoctrination.
    - a. Apoliticism of many scientists and intellectuals.
    - b. Stereotyping of propaganda and agitation by bureaucratic cadres.
    - c. Boredom or at least indifference toward ideological instruction among students and young careerists.

D. Difficulty of assessing vitality of ideological motivation shown in our own system.

1. Basically a church-going, honest people, yet many signs point to doubts and waverings on what Communists call "unity of theory and practice" especially in field of public and private morality.
2. Fact that the President has appointed Commission on National Goals indicates basic malaise.

E. Communists presumably do not have to define their goals, but they are constantly feeling their own ideological pulse.

1. Whole history of movement shows concern with effectiveness of indoctrination, almost endless series of pep-talks to cadres. Usual remedy for apathy is simply exhortation, coupled with insistence that more time be devoted to subject.
2. January 1960 decree on propaganda and indoctrination a landmark in process of perennial revitalization. Document has a ring that earlier efforts lacked. It deserves thoughtful study, especially as to its consequences. Almost as though it said "Yes, we've said it before and we meant it, but this time we really mean it!"

F. Where is the vulnerability?

1. Objective truth of the doctrine readily assailable.  
Attack on its intellectual consistency relatively easy and has been effectively done, especially by the Jesuit Father, Georg Wetter, whose approach is as nearly dispassionate as can probably be achieved, hence recognized as all the more dangerous by the Communist ideologists.
2. But its objective truth is not the criterion of the doctrine's strength, rather its subjective acceptance as a gospel. It has the blinding, compelling characteristics of other religious convictions, to mention only one - which Communism has had to attack - Jehovah's Witnesses.
3. Hence, we are not likely to get far by mere destructive criticism. Rather we must attack the vulnerability at the point of exit from mere theory into what the Communists love to call "life itself."
4. Wolfgang Leonhard, a defector from East German Communism - who went through advanced schools for Communist functionaries in USSR - points out

purely destructive Western attacks on ideology make little impact on disciplined cadres. What is damaging to morale are what they call "bellyaches," i.e. self-generated disturbances growing out of the conflict between theory and actual practice, e.g. contrast between image of classless society and privileges enjoyed by party elite, between Leninist doctrine of equal treatment of nationalities, and obvious oppression of Soviet minorities or satellite nations.

- G. Conclusion is that Marxist-Leninist ideology has both tendency to deterioration and capacity for self-renewal. Latter may be greatly strengthened by Chinese Communists, who still in first generation of revolution, and will not allow Soviet zeal to flag without a challenge. Whether they, in turn, will be assailed by "belly-aches" remains to be seen. We cannot count on it now. Hence, while we must continue to oppose and refute Communist ideology on a world scale, we must accompany this campaign with a determined effort to demonstrate our own "unity of theory and practice."

- X. The "material base" for the transition to Communism.
  - A. Soviet theorists and propagandists incessantly repeat line which dominated the XXI Congress: Communism cannot be achieved until massive material base has been laid. There must be such productive capacity that needs of all men can be fully supplied, leaving ample residue of leisure for their enjoyment, and for cultivation of physical, moral, intellectual, artistic, and spiritual aspirations of man.
  - B. Basic requirement of "transition," then, is to heighten productivity. This involves:
    - 1. Continued primary emphasis on expanding heavy industry base, "more machines to produce machines to produce machines." This is dictated by
      - a. Military requirements, unless disarmament is achieved.
      - b. Requirements of agriculture, still an intractable problem, which calls for further mechanization and massive increments of fertilizer.
      - c. Requirements for capital equipment to develop consumer goods field, especially housing construction and household appliances.

- d. Requirements of aggressive economic policy in under-developed areas.
- 2. Continued increase in science and technology, especially automation and control techniques:
  - a. USSR has probably reached point where "anything we can do, they can do well enough" in most fields. Major pockets of backwardness, especially chemical industry, are being attacked with same vigor as lines which led to Sputniks.
  - b. Soviet dogmatism and rigidity led to resistance against cybernetics until mid-1950's. Since then they have forced ahead, and may soon outstrip us in theory and technique.
- 3. Rationalization of economic system without departing from basic principles of central planning and control, includes:
  - a. So-called "decentralization" to regional level (sovnarkhoz) basically recognition of need to de-congest central bureaucratic mechanism, and allow necessary flexibility in detailed decisions at lower level.

- b. Abolition of MTS, and strengthening kolkhoz system, preliminary to long range program of assimilating state and collective farms into a single system of national property - eliminating distinction of town and country.
- c. Rationalization of cost accounting, pricing and other aspects of economic management, including quiet scrapping of ideological taboo against interest and obsolescence concepts.
- d. Generally increasing labor productivity rather than accepting declining level usually associated with mature economies.
- e. Strengthening incentive principle by eliminating grosser forms of wage inequality, increasing pensions, and gradually shortening working hours.

C. Is there a vulnerability in this ambitious program?

In optimistic spirit with which the Soviet economy was viewed by West as recently as five years ago, almost certainly there is little. The following alleged vulnerabilities frequently pointed out in the past may be considered:



1. Soviet natural resources will eventually prove inadequate. (This was mistakenly predicted for iron ore as recently as 1956).
  - a. Best judgment is that no shortage, which could not be met elsewhere in Bloc, can seriously impede Soviet productive advance.
  - b. Soviet Union maintains it has choice between extensive trade with Free World or autarkic development which would be slightly slower, but not seriously frustrating.
2. Conflicts will develop between party cadres and industrial managers, who will seek to moderate zeal of communist imperialism, and preserve their own privileges and avoid risks. Few today place much stock in this:
  - a. Technical-managerial and party hierarchies interpenetrate; constant rotation of functions, but Party remains senior and all-powerful authority.
  - b. 'New worlds to conquer' theme for industrial managers brighter than ever. They have nothing to lose from Party's ambitious schemes.

3. Pressure for consumer goods, as in affluent societies of West, will force regime to shift priorities, and divert resources away from sinews of power, military and economic. This is possible but unlikely to go far.
  - a. Current drive to ameliorate lot of consumer truly remarkable. Regime has in effect bought American system of distribution, super-market, home delivery, and creation of new wants by attractive merchandising and advertising. It is greatly increasing variety of products and supporting services. We may still regard this as step toward softening Soviet aggressiveness, but Khrushchev appears confident it will advance Communist appeal to underdeveloped countries, heighten internal morale and pave way for rapid transition to Communism.
  - b. Education and indoctrination of new "Communist man" will concentrate on inculcating appreciation of material comforts, while subordinating them to other considerations (see below).

D. In sum, difficult to see where any crippling vulnerability lies. Certainly classic war- and peacetime concepts of economic warfare not applicable here. We cannot on a major scale pre-empt supplies, disrupt markets, or create artificial internal stresses in the Soviet economy. In last analysis, all we can do is to accept Khrushchev's challenge and outcompete. Whether affluence, which now seems inevitable within a short span of time, will mellow Soviet people, and thereby their leaders, remains to be seen. But optimistic or complacent anticipation of this prospect would almost certainly be subjected to some rude shocks.

XI. Creation of the "new Communist man."

A. Long background in both Tsarist Russian and Communist thought.

1. Partly Great Russian "messianism," vision of a new quasi-religious image of man (Chernyeshevsky.)
2. Partly "objective" based on Marxist emphasis on science.
3. First 40 years of Communist regime talked a great deal about "new man" but actually did little more than tremendous beefing up of education, primarily on conventional Western lines.

B. During past few years, especially since triumph of Khrushchev in July 1957, there has been a real, concerted drive to create an image of man which would actually be new.

1. Focus in educational decree which preceded XXI CPSU Congress January 1959, and was companion piece to Seven Year Plan which outlined "material base" for transition.
2. Abundance of supporting propaganda since then, and intense concentration in Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and Academy of Social Sciences.
3. Direct control by Central Committee and Presidium of this primary drive - believed Suslov may be key figure in program.

C. Major effort to establish scientific basis of character formation process.

1. Previously top priority had been in physical sciences, leading to great technological "leap" culminating in Sputniks.
2. Whole system of scientific priorities was revamped during 1959 - 30 categories, ranging from nuclear

physics through all natural sciences, but also including social sciences, and what we would regard as "humanities" - i.e. architecture, linguistics and fine arts.

3. Parallel major reorganization of effort, especially in Academy of Sciences - vast structure with enormous power and capabilities, which has no parallel in any other country.
  - a. Rationalization of tie-in between central and local institutes.
  - b. Inter-disciplinary Councils and Commissions, coordinating work of Institutes and Academies with that of Government ministries.
  - c. Active discussion of extending role of industrial enterprises in support of Research and Development. Hitherto Academies and Institutes have predominated, sharp contrast to system in this country, where bulk of Research and Development is done by private companies (universities poor second except in basic science) largely on government orders and contracts. (Danger in

this country that Research and Development will become so expensive that only the largest companies can do it, and that motive of profitability may diminish work in areas where immediate practical results can not be obtained).

4. Enormous crop of trained scientists built up in USSR during past 10-20 years of high priority education now fully in pipeline. Prospects for forging ahead of US in all fields during next ten years, unless our own effort greatly enhanced.

D. Progress in behavioral sciences may be their ultimate Sputnik.

1. Strait-jacket of Pavlovian psychology made official in 1950 decree, now removed.
  - a. Soviet scientists in all fields encouraged to study pre-Communist Russian and classic Western disciplines.
  - b. Soviet psychologists now acquainted with our experimental psychological work, some of which closely related to Pavlovian conceptions (e.g. Skinner at Harvard). Importance of exchange visits of psychologists.

- c. Still reject Freudian concepts primarily on ideological grounds, but also, perhaps from sound intuition, that these are not compatible with the kind of "Communist man" they are trying to create.
  - d. One of our problems is the obverse, to be better acquainted with work which Soviet psychologists are doing.
2. Principal feature of biological behavioral and social-economic studies is introduction of cybernetic approach and computer techniques.
- a. Again Stalinist dogmatism had made study of Western cybernetic-control techniques impossible.
  - b. But beginning in 1954 a major shift occurred, and today men like Leontieff and Norbert Wiener are virtual gods in USSR. In short space of five years, they have demonstrated full ability to master our techniques of computer programming (so-called "algorithms") and may, as in field of

mathematics and chess, prove to be world's best. They even talk about "cybernetics" replacing "dialectical materialism"!

- c. Besides theoretic achievements, Soviet scientists have also made major technical break-throughs, e.g. development of a 250 lead electro-encephelograph, with direct reading of the composite on a television screen - one can actually in effect see the brain at work. Our best machines have 16 leads!
- d. At same time they are studying pedagogy in human terms
  - (1) process begins at birth, and there is even study of possibility of pre-natal external influences.
  - (2) education processes from pre-kindergarten have struck our exchange visitors as warm and even affectionate, creating an anxiety-free type of youngster, lacking to be sure much of spontaneity which we prize.



(3) institutional structure of education  
being modified gradually to insure  
effectiveness of indoctrination.

(a) Development of boarding schools  
proceeding slowly, but is expected  
to be the universal form in future.

(b) Removal of parental influence, coupled  
with indoctrination along scientific  
pedagogic lines is expected to make  
for complete plasticity - individual  
will be moulded to ideology!

E. Is this a vulnerability?

1. Many observers have been frightened by what is  
already being accomplished.

a. Product is not monsters, robots, but apparently  
well adjusted individuals.

b. What kind of society would emerge from a  
generation in which anxiety had been  
eliminated?

2. Can the two aspects of human nature - individualism  
and collectivism - be combined in harmony?

- a. Fact that the system now permits exposure to alien ideas, including those of the West, may make for eventual "contradictions."
  - b. Exposure to scientific truth, in our experience leads to development of a critical spirit. But is this necessarily so when the entire process is guided by a dominant ideology?
3. CPSU well aware of dangers of contamination by alien ideas, and vigilant against them.
- a. Recent decree (mentioned above) part of general campaign to make indoctrination "creative" and vital.
  - b. Practical measures introduced, notably combination of secondary education with productive labor in factories, designed to prevent drift toward academicism or "divorce from life."
- Too early to say how effective this will be.

E. Summary and Conclusions.

- 1. A true "Communist" educational system seems to be evolving.

- a. Apparently a similar process taking place in China, though we know less of this. Presumably there is cross-fertilization and coordination.
  - b. "System" not yet crystallized and shows considerable flexibility. It may turn out different from what we - or they - think.
2. It is presented in a matrix of "humanism."
  - a. As in case of other Western concepts - Freedom, Democracy, Commonwealth - Communists claim to have the "true" version, as against the "bourgeois" corruption which has taken place in West.
  - b. Great emphasis on "cultural, spiritual, and moral" values which will emerge from program.
3. Apparently Communists expect this to bear fruition in the upcoming generation - current generation, however, not given up as "lost." Adult education and re-indoctrination being pursued in parallel.
4. This is a formidable challenge, especially at a time when our own concepts of education and character formation are in flux.

5. There may be a vulnerability here, something that runs counter to human nature, but it will have to develop of itself. There appears to be nothing we can do to affect it. Pointing out pitfalls will only help the Communists to avoid them.

XII "Withering away of the State"

- A. As indicated above, this hoary cliché of Marxism creates certain embarrassment for theorists of "transition."
  1. Stalin declared State necessary until full material base had been laid, and until "capitalist encirclement" eliminated.
  2. Both aspects this proposition provide ample ground for projecting Soviet State well into future.
    - a. "Material base" will include not only that of USSR, but of other countries of the "world socialist system." If this expands beyond its present 12 members, and takes in "under-developed areas," obviously process of enabling them to catch up and enter Communism "almost simultaneously" will be of indefinite duration.

- b. Similarly, though capitalism no longer "encircles," and may even be threatened with "socialist encirclement," it will continue to threaten the Bloc or Commonwealth for some, perhaps a long time. Communists, while predicting its inevitable collapse, are wary of specifying imminence of the event.
  - c. Universal disarmament would remove part of reason for existence of strong Soviet State, but its other, primarily economic functions would remain well into, if not throughout "transition."
- B. Importance of making token payments toward a "stateless" regime.
- 1. Already noted some institutional changes taking place, especially in field of routine law-enforcement - chiefly at level of drunkenness, hooliganism and minor anti-social behavior.
  - 2. This creates problems for conventional instrumentalities of law enforcement, and could, conceivably, get out of hand. But regime can probably prevent this.

3. Chief area in which further progress might be made includes trade unions, and kolkhoz-sovkhoz organizations.
  - a. Has been suggested that "workers' councils might develop in USSR, as in Yugoslavia, and very tentatively and unsuccessfully in 1956-7 in Poland. This would certainly be a form of "creative Leninism, " but so far Soviet regime has rebuffed the idea. Trade unions, however, being given somewhat greater scope but nothing comparable to that of Western counterparts.
  - b. Decentralized interkolkhoz organization is being encouraged, and may lead to development of Khrushchev's agrorods, rural towns which he tried out for size in 1950-51 but later backed away from. Ironically, example of Chinese communes, which initially viewed frostily in USSR, might be influential, if they succeed.

C. Is the "withering" doctrine a vulnerability?

- 1 Certainly there is a problem here. State is "universal bureaucracy, " and, we all know, bureaucracies do

not legislate themselves out of existence -

no evidence that they even "fade away."

2. Much depends on basic success of the two-pronged drive described above - attainment of "material base" and creation of "new Communist man." If these prove feasible, and not Utopian, quite possibly a gradual dwindling of massive state apparatus would take place, pari passu.
3. Meantime, there is a limited vulnerability here, in that we can point out the essentially evasive attitude which Communist propaganda is forced to take toward the time table and phases of "withering" process. This could create "bellyaches."

### XIII Role of the Communist Party

- A. Party is expected to be necessary throughout transition.
  1. This is a "directed" process, and Communist Party alone has ultimate directing authority.
  2. The process, although historically inevitable, requires active support of human will, and Party alone can centralize and focus necessary dynamics.

B. Is there a vulnerability here?

1. Obviously CPSU like Soviet State is a bureaucracy, and is not about to commit suicide. It has custody of ideology and power, and could hardly be expected to give that up, short of the millenium.
2. Again, as in the "withering" doctrine, we may point out certain ironical features of this self-perpetuating hierarchy.
3. But we should not antid pate that this will generate major "bellyaches, " such as come from contrast between what party proclaims and what it practices. It is here that dedication of Party enters area of fanaticism which cannot be dented by arguments of reason or shafts of ridicule.
4. Finally, the question, will the Party itself, by an unplanned and spontaneous process, "wither" away, simply because its mission is accomplished. This gets us into pure "Utopianism, " and can hardly be subject of fruitful speculation for our own lifetime.



Conclusion

- A. This analysis is not exhaustive, and does not include a number of important specific areas, such as Sino-Soviet foreign policy "contradictions," attitudes of intellectuals, ferment in minority nationalities of the USSR, disaffection of satellites, general impact of foreign exchanges, etc. All of these areas of potential vulnerability deserve careful analysis, free of wishfulness or complacency.
- B. Primary effort has been to point out significance of the "transition to Communism." Too little awareness in this country and in Free World.
- C. Still requires extensive study. We must focus efforts of government and private institutions and individuals much more effectively. Review of policy making process (Jackson Committee), and effectiveness of our propaganda (Sprague Commission) should contribute greatly.
- D. Real problem, as stated above, is not to exploit Communist vulnerabilities so much as to develop Free World strengths. President's national goals commission could be most important event of this era. Meanwhile, we must individually carry out our own examination of our personal goals and of their equation with that of our nation.